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Esteemed Rector Magnificus, Members of the Board of the University,  
Dear Colleagues and Students, Family and Friends,  





In this lecture, I would like to revisit the controversy surrounding one of the oldest 
divisions common to European legal culture – the division of the law into public 
and private. I will do so within the particular context of the law of the European 
Union (commonly referred to as EU law). But let me first introduce you to a 
fictious person – let us call him Martin – who will help us explore the meaning of 
these abstract legal categories and their role in shaping our lives today. Martin 
is a 25 years old EU citizen and a graduate of the University of Groningen who 
has just started his first job. Like many other young people, he wants to make 
the most out of life but is also concerned about the state of our planet.  
 
What Martin needs to be able to lead a meaningful life is the law, in particular 
public and private law. The conceptual distinction between public and private 
law has primarily evolved in continental legal systems, such as the Netherlands. 
It is not unknown, however, to common law systems, such as England and 
Wales, either. In both legal traditions, public law generally focuses on the 
relationship between public authorities and citizens or between public 
authorities themselves. It also equips public authorities (including private 
organisations acting in this capacity) with the powers and enforcement 
instruments necessary to act in the public interest. As a citizen, Martin has 
fundamental rights against his State under constitutional law, such as the right 
to life, liberty and privacy. These rights not only prohibit public authorities, for 
instance, from taping Martin’s telephone conversations without an appropriate 
justification. They also oblige such authorities to take a positive action to 
protect the environment in which he lives. In the pursuit of this important public 
interest, the State may adopt administrative regulations cutting the maximum 
speed limit on its roads to just 100km/h. And if Martin does not slow down, he 
may get a hefty fine under administrative law.  
 
In contrast, national private law has been traditionally conceived of as that 
part of law which secures a sphere of positive freedom and interpersonal justice 
for individuals like Martin. It constructs a legal framework which allows private 
persons to shape their relationships with each other and which primarily seeks 
to ensure the balance between the private interests of these persons through 
their respective rights and obligations. Within such a framework, for example, 
Martin does not have to buy an expensive Tesla to address environmental 
concerns of the society as a whole. He may simply buy any car he likes and opt 
for a much cheaper Volkswagen. If the seller then refuses to deliver the car due 
under the sales contract, as a buyer, Martin has a right as against that seller to 
claim performance and/or damages under contract law. But if he then 
accidentally drives the newly bought Volkswagen into his neighbour’s front 
 
 
door, the neighbour is entitled to compensation for this wrongful injury under 
tort law. In case the breaching party does not perform the contract or pay 
damages, the innocent party will typically have to take action before a court.         
 
Over the last couple of decades, the public/private divide along these lines 
has been challenged on multiple grounds and has probably been most 
debated in the context of EU law. The thing is that EU law does not recognize 
the distinction between public and private law as it had evolved within the 
national legal systems of its Member States. However, I will argue today that 
the conceptual distinction between these well-established categories does 
matter not only in national law but also in EU law and that it may profoundly 
affect the legal position of people like Martin. This argument will be developed 
in three consecutive steps. First of all, I will explore the character of EU private 
law and explain how this fast-developing legal field challenges the traditional 
public/private divide (Part II). I will then show that this distinction is nevertheless 
not entirely foreign to EU private law (Part III). Finally, I will draw out the 































II. The Character of EU Private Law and the Blurring Line 
between Public and Private Law 
 
In a broad sense, EU private law can be understood as that part of EU law which 
shapes the relationships between private parties. The emergence of EU private 
law is inextricably linked to the idea of creating the internal market, which is 
central to the EU. Within the EU internal market, goods, services, capital and 
labour are to move freely between – at least for now – 28 Member States. By 
allowing greater competition and boosting trade between Member States, 
such a vast market is supposed to enhance the prosperity and well-being of EU 
citizens like Martin. To realise the internal market, the EU has not only sought to 
dismantle national barriers to free movement, such as import tariffs (a process 
known as ‘negative integration’), but also to introduce common European 
rules under which the market operates (a process known as ‘positive 
integration’). The bulk of such rules in the field of EU private law has developed 
after the adoption of the Single European Act 1986. In particular, the Act 
recognized the need for a high level of consumer protection in the internal 
market, paving the way for the EU harmonisation of national laws in many 
areas, such as non-discrimination, product safety, sales of goods, energy, 
telecommunications, financial services, to name but a few.  
Today EU private law is thus only in its thirties, quite young compared to 
the centuries-old national private law. And yet it profoundly challenges the 
public/private divide and, in particular, the notion of private law as it had 
developed in the nation-state context. Unlike national private law, EU private 
law is not primarily concerned with people and their private interests as ends in 
themselves. Rather, it tends to view private persons as a means to the creation 
of the internal market. The ultimate goal is to enable and encourage our Martin 
to reap its benefits. In his capacity as a consumer, for instance, Martin is 
expected to shop cross-border and buy not only goods, such as cars, but also 
services, such as credit, in Member States other than his own. Insofar as justice 
considerations influence EU private law, they are mainly concerned with what 
Hans Micklitz has called ‘access justice’ beyond the nation-state.1 Access 
justice enables EU citizens to participate in the internal market but, as such, 
cannot be equated with interpersonal justice pursued by national private law.     
To foster cross-border trade, the EU legislator has been harmonising 
national laws in a piecemeal fashion. For these purposes, it has been using and 
experimenting with private law concepts, notably from the fields of contract 
and tort law, as tools of market integration. The private law concepts in turn 
have often been combined with the public law concepts, especially from the 
fields of constitutional and administrative law. In so doing, the EU legislator does 
not, at least not explicitly, prescribe in which body of law Member States should 
transpose a particular EU directive.  
The resulting body of EU private law rules looks like a patchwork quilt from 
Vincent van Gogh’s paintings, including elements of both public and private 
 
1 H.-W. Micklitz, The Politics of Justice in European Private Law: Social Justice, Access Justice, Societal 
Justice (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 2 et seq.      
 
 
law. It is regulatory and functional in nature; a kind of ‘techno-law’, as Hugh 
Collins put it.2 EU private law does not substitute national private law as the basis 
of private law relationships but rather relies on it for the realisation of its policy 
goals. At the same time, by virtue of its very nature, EU private law prompts or 
fosters the development of legal hybrids, both at the EU and national level.  
 
One of such hybrids is the ‘constitutionalised private law’.3 It stems from 
the fact that all EU harmonisation measures, including those in the field of 
private law, must comply with fundamental rights, notably the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. The Charter brings non-market considerations into the 
market-biased EU private law. The private law relationships within the scope of 
EU law, such as the one between Martin and Facebook, for example, are 
therefore not immune from the impact of fundamental rights. After all, when 
regulating BigTech companies, including Facebook, the EU legislator must 
ensure that such companies respect their users’ fundamental rights to privacy 
and protection of personal data.4 Facebook is not a State. But when using 
Martin’s data for targeted adverts, it poses a threat to his privacy and 
protection of personal data on the same scale as the State does when taping 
his telephone conversations. Ironically, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckenberg has 
 
2 H. Collins, ‘The Revolutionary Trajectory of EU Contract Law Towards Post-national Law’, in S. Worthington 
et al. (eds), Revolution and Evolution in Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2018) 315, at 317.   
3 H.-W. Micklitz, ‘Rethinking the Public/Private Divide’, in M. Maduro et al. (eds), Transnational Law: 
Rethinking European Law and Legal Thinking (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 271. On this phenomenon, 
see, e.g., O.O. Cherednychenko, Fundamental Rights, Contract Law and the Protection of the Weaker Party: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Constitutionalisation of Contract Law, with Emphasis on Risky Financial 
Transactions (Sellier European Law Publishers, 2007). 
4 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, arts 7 and 8, respectively.  
 




even admitted himself that his social media giant is ‘more like a government 
than a traditional company.’5  
Another example of a legal hybrid is what I called ‘supervision private 
law’.6 This oxymoron reflects the rise of supervision by European and national 
administrative agencies over private law relationships in complex markets with 
information asymmetry between market participants. Financial markets are a 
case in point. Martin increasingly depends on financial markets – and private 
law that constitutes them – to be able to meet his essential needs. To buy a 
house and make it eco-friendlier, for instance, he would typically need to 
conclude a mortgage contract. However, as the latest global financial crisis 
has shown, financial markets across the EU have not always worked well for 
European consumers like Martin. In the Netherlands, for instance, since 1993 
consumers have been sold around 7 million of so-called investment insurance 
policies, better known as woekerpolissen (or exorbitant policies), worth around 
EUR 100 billon.7 At the point of sale, financial firms typically promised consumers 
high investment returns, high enough to pay off their mortgage. But in reality, 
these returns were never realised, as consumers ended up paying between EUR 
20 and EUR 30 billion on commissions and other costs to financial firms.8 For 
ordinary people like Martin, it was virtually impossible to fully comprehend the 
toxic nature of the woekerpolis at the time of purchase. Therefore, to ensure 
consumer protection against such products and the well-functioning of 
financial markets more generally, financial watchdogs – such as the Dutch 
Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) and the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA) – are increasingly ‘managing’ private law relationships 
throughout the financial product life-cycle and in the distribution process.  
This analysis reveals an increasing entanglement of the public and 
private spheres and enforcement modes in the process of the Europeanisation 
of private law. But does such entanglement imply that the orthodox distinction 
between public and private law has not played any role whatsoever in the 
making of EU private law? Or does it mean that this distinction has become 
wholly obsolete in the context of a post-nation state European private law 









5 See, e.g., H. Farrell et al., ‘Mark Zuckenberg Runs a Nation State, and He’s the King’, Vox, 10 April 2018; 
<https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/2018/4/9/17214752/zuckerberg-facebook-power-regulation-data-privacy-
control-political-theory-data-breach-king>.    
6 O.O. Cherednychenko, ‘Public Supervision over Private Relationships: Towards European Supervision Private 
Law?’ (2014) 22 European Review of Private Law 37.  
7 Consumentenbond, ‘Wat is een woekerpolis?’, 21 September 2018; 




III. Rediscovering the Public/Private Divide in EU Private 
Law 
 
The point that I would like to make is this. Although EU private law does not 
recognize and even profoundly challenges the conventional distinction 
between public and private law, it nevertheless displays some of the signs of 
this distinction. When pursuing similar policy goals, some EU measures are 
clearly more oriented towards public law, whereas others have been written 
from a more private law perspective. Most importantly, the legal grammar in 
this sense does matter in practice for people like Martin in terms of their rights 
and remedies in case of breach of EU law. To illustrate the contrast I seek to 
draw between public and private law within EU private law, I will provide three 
sets of examples.   
 
 
Unfair Contract Terms Directive vs. Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 
 
Let me start by juxtaposing two major EU horizontal measures with relevance to 
contract and tort law – the Unfair Contract Terms Directive9 and the Unfair 
Commercial Practice Directive.10 
To purchase a product or a service he likes, Martin must typically agree 
with the general terms and conditions pre-formulated by the trader. Such 
standard terms are often contained in small print documents that hardly 
anyone reads. (I wonder if there are any lawyers in this room today who 
actually read them when creating his or her personal Facebook, Twitter or 
LinkedIn account.) This makes consumers vulnerable to the abuse of power by 
traders who may, for example, exclude Martin’s right to compensation if the 
trader does not deliver the Volkswagen car. To address this problem, the EU has 
adopted the Unfair Contract Terms Directive. Even though this EU measure fits 
into the general objective of completing the EU internal market, it is also clearly 
concerned with justice between the consumer and the trader, in line with the 
traditional private law approach. In particular, the directive does not allow that 
the standard contract terms create an imbalance between the consumer’s 
and trader’s rights and obligations. Member States are obliged to have 
administrative agencies in place to prevent the use of unfair contract terms. At 
the same time, the directive explicitly confers an individual right on consumers 
under EU law not to be bound by such terms. Moreover, to ensure that 
consumers also have an effective remedy under the directive, the Court of 
Justice of the EU has strengthened their procedural position in disputes with 
traders. The obligation of the national courts to assess the fairness of contract 
 
9 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJEC 1993 L 95/29. 
10 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, 
Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation 
(EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJEU 2005 L149/22. 
 
 
terms on their own motion11 – when a consumer does not raise this issue at all – 
is just one example of the Court’s judicial activism in this context.     
The distinctly ‘private law’ grammar of the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive becomes especially clear when we compare it with the Unfair 
Commercial Practices Directive. This more ‘public law’-oriented EU measure 
forbids misleading or aggressive business-to-consumer marketing practices that 
could harm consumers’ economic interests. Take the example of the recent 
‘Dieselgate’ scandal over Volkswagen falsifying emissions data. Such a 
practice can be considered misleading under the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive. For it may have induced our environmentally-minded Martin into 
buying his Volkswagen car. And yet, the directive confers no individual rights 
on consumers who have become victims of unfair conduct. This means that 
Martin has no remedy under EU law to get out of the contract with the car 
seller. Nor is he entitled under EU law to sue the car manufacturer Volkswagen, 
which had installed the emissions-test-cheating device in his car, for damages 
in tort. Instead, the directive provides for public and collective enforcement of 
its provisions through inunctions and fines to prevent and deter unfair 
commercial practices. As a result, the ability of the victims of such practices to 
obtain adequate redress largely depends on national private law. However, 
national contract and tort law does not always enable such redress.12 
Interestingly, the European Commission’s recent legislative initiative, called 
somewhat ambitiously ‘New Deal for Consumers’,13 seeks to harmonise 
contractual and non-contractual remedies for breach of the Unfair 
Commercial Practice Directive. In my view, this is the acknowledgment of the 
major limitations of its ‘public law’ grammar in protecting consumers.  
 
 
Product Liability Directive vs. Environmental Liability Directive 
          
A further, even more striking, contrast between the two types of legal grammar 
within EU private law emerges when we consider the second set of examples – 
the Product Liability Directive,14 as opposed to the Environmental Liability 
Directive.15 Both measures use tort law as an instrument of market integration, 
but in a very different way. The adoption of the Product Liability Directive was 
prompted by the thalidomide tragedy in the 1960s. Thalidomide, a drug which 
 
11 See, e.g., Case C-243/08, Pannon GSM Zrt. v Erzsébet Sustikné Győrfi [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:350; Case C-
137/08, VB Pénzügyi Lízing Zrt. v Ferenc Schneider [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:659; Case C-76/10, Pohotovosť s. 
r. o. v Iveta Korčkovská [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:685; Case C-472/10, Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v 
Invitel Távközlési Zrt [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:242; Case C-472/11, Banif Plus Bank Zrt v Csaba Csipai, 
Viktória Csipai [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:88. 
12 European Commission, Report on the Fitness Check of EU consumer and marketing law, SWD(2017) 208 
final, at 77 et seq.  
13 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee ‘A New Deal for Consumers’, COM(2018) 183 final.   
14 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products, OJEC 1985 L 
210/29. 
15 Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on environmental 
liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, OJEU 2004 L 143/56. 
 
 
was marketed as a mild sleeping pill safe even for pregnant women, caused 
thousands of babies worldwide to be born with malformed limbs. The directive 
lays down rules on the producers’ liability for defective products, such as 
Thalidomide. The ‘private law’ grammar of the Product Liability Directive 
becomes apparent from the directive’s basic scheme which is clearly 
concerned with ensuring the balance between injured persons’ and 
producers’ interests and with individual consumer redress. It imposes liability 
without fault, or strict liability, on producers for damage caused by a defect in 
their products. Compensation can be claimed for death or personal injury as 
well as the destruction of any item of property other than the defective product 
itself. To enable consumers like Martin to make use of this European remedy, 
the Court of Justice of the EU has repeatedly found national rules that facilitate 
consumers in proving a causal link between the product defect and the 
damage compatible with the directive.16   
At first sight, the Environmental Liability Directive looks quite similar. This 
directive establishes a framework for environmental liability, based on the 
‘polluter pays’ principle, using characteristic private law concepts. In 
particular, operators of dangerous activities can be held strictly liable under 
the directive for the damage to protected species and natural habitats, water, 
and soil. If, for example, an oil barge catches fire when passing through one of 
the Dutch canals, its operator will have to remedy the environmental damage 
caused by it, even if the incident has occurred without any fault on its part. 
However, when we look closer at the directive, we see that, in essence, it 
establishes a public law regime of administrative responsibility. Crucially, the 
directive requires public authorities to ensure that polluters limit or prevent 
further environmental damage and take remedial action. It also explicitly 
excludes the private parties’ right to compensation for such damage. So if 
Martin’s neighbourhood on the canal’s bank is severely affected by the fire on 
the oil barge, he does not have a European remedy under the directive. It is 
also not surprising that this ‘public law’-coloured EU measure has had very 
limited harmonizing effects on national tort law. 
 
 
Payment Services Directive II vs. Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II 
 
The EU legislation in the field of financial services – notably the Payment Services 
Directive II (PSD II)17 and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID 
II)18 – affords the third remarkable illustration of the public/private dichotomy 
 
16 See, e.g., Case C-310/13 Novo Nordisk Pharma GmbH v S [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2385 (the consumer’s 
right to require the manufacturer of a medicinal product to provide him with information on the adverse effects 
of that product); Case C-621/15 N.W., L.W., C.W. v Sanofi Pasteur MSD SNC, Caisse primaire d’assurance 
maladie des Hauts-de-Seine, Carpimko [2017] ECLI:EU:C:2017:484 (evidentiary rules under which certain 
factual evidence can be considered to constitute evidence of a defect in the medicinal product and the causal link 
with the damage, even if there is no conclusive scientific evidence on this). 
17 Directive (EU) 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 on payment 
services in the internal market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation 
(EU) No 1093/2010, and repealing Directive 2007/64/EC, OJEU 2015 L 337/35.       
18 Directive 2014/65/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on markets in financial 
instruments and amending Directive 2002/92/EC and Directive 2011/61/EU, OJEU 2014 L 173/349.  
 
 
within EU private law. For the purposes of PSD II, the EU legislator has clearly 
chosen a combination of public and private law rules. The public law rules 
govern authorisation and supervision of payment service providers. To foster 
competition, for instance, they require banks to allow non-bank, typically 
‘fintech’, companies to access banks’ payments systems and client data 
bases. The PSD II’s private law component in turn concerns the parties’ rights 
and obligations in relation to payment services and is especially strong 
compared to many other EU measures. Importantly, PSD II even addresses the 
allocation of losses between the bank and its client in case of fraud, forgery 
and error. As a general rule, for example, Martin’s bank will be liable for all losses 
that he has suffered in case of unauthorised transactions on his credit card. 
In contrast, the major EU investor protection measure – MiFID II – was 
drafted from the manifestly public law perspective. It provides one of the best 
illustrations of the hybrid ‘supervision private law’ mentioned above. To enable 
administrative agencies to supervise securities markets, MiFID II includes an 
extensive set of conduct of business rules for investment firms, such as the firm’s 
duty to act in the best interests of its client. These rules indirectly set standards 
of investment firms’ behaviour in the private law relationship with their clients, 
as the term ‘supervision private law’ suggests. For instance, they do not allow a 
portfolio manager to invest Martin’s money into the fossil fuel industry if he has 
clearly indicated that he wishes to support renewable energy companies. At 
the same time, because of the directive’s almost exclusive focus on public 
supervision, the MiFID II conduct of business rules were implemented by the 
Member States within the financial supervisory frameworks. From a legal-
technical point of view, therefore, these are public law rules concerned with 
the relationship between an investment firm and a public authority which can 
enforce them through public law means. In the absence of individual rights and 
remedies under MiFID II, it largely depends on national private law whether 
Martin will obtain compensation in case of the investment firm’s breach of its 
formally public law duties. The key issue is whether such duties can have effect 
in national contract and tort law, and the approaches adopted by national 
civil courts tend to vary. As shown by the case law under the MiFID’s II 
predecessor – MiFID I, Martin is much more likely to obtain relief under Dutch 
law, for example, than under English law. Importantly, the Court of Justice of 
the EU has not seized the opportunity to put an end to this controversy.19   
 
As these three sets of examples demonstrate, a distinction reminiscent of the 
traditional public/private divide can be traced in EU private law. When 
pursuing similar policy goals, some EU harmonisation measures are clearly 
concerned with the balance between the private parties’ rights and 
obligations or individual redress. In contrast, other such measures focus on the 
relationship between public authorities and private parties, and the role of 
public authorities in securing business compliance with harmonised rules. 
Overall, the more ‘public’ or ‘private law’ grammar of EU harmonisation 
measures is not the result of a systematic analysis of the relative merits of each 
 




grammar option in terms of their appropriateness for achieving particular policy 
objectives. Rather, apart from the overall regulatory bias of the EU integration 
paradigm, the legal grammar of EU measures appears to be primarily dictated 
by two factors. First, it is path dependency of harmonisation in a given area 
(notably pre-existence of the national or EU legal framework of a particular 
type). Second, these are the political constraints surrounding the EU law-
making process (notably resistance of the industry and/or Member States to 
the harmonisation of civil liability).  
And yet, the legal grammar of a particular EU measure does matter in 
practice when it comes to the position of private parties like our Martin in case 
of breach of harmonised rules. Once a certain EU directive is adopted, the 
availability of individual rights and remedies in various legal systems will to an 
important degree be determined by the particular balance of public and 
private law elements that have emerged from the EU’s legislative itinerary. 
Member States are clearly obliged to provide for individual rights and remedies 
within their national laws where a given EU measures is concerned, among 
other things, with interpersonal justice. However, they have much more room 
for manoeuvre where this is not the case. The differences between the ‘public’ 
and ‘private law’-coloured EU measures may be reduced to some degree by 
the Court of Justice of the EU. But the Court’s ability and willingness to ‘insert’ 
individual remedies into the public law-oriented measures is not self-evident. In 
the end, the choice for a ‘public‘ or ‘private law’ grammar in a particular EU 
measure also matters in terms of speed and efficacy with which its policy goals 




























I believe that the major lesson that can be drawn from this is that EU law should 
stop ignoring the existing differences between public and private law 
approaches. Instead, it should explicitly adopt the public/private language in 
its discourse. Rediscovering the public/private divide in this sense does not 
mean redrawing the strict line between public and private law. As we saw 
before, the dividing line between public and private law has indeed blurred. 
However, the rise of hybrid phenomena in the context of a post-nation state EU 
private law does not mean that we should get rid of the public/private 
dichotomy altogether as the irrelevant legacy of the nation-state. As Armin von 
Bogdandy remarked when exploring the idea of contemporary European 
public law, ‘any observation of hybridity requires an understanding of the 
individual components that render something hybrid; a hybrid car is a car that 
uses combustion engine and an electric motor (…).20 In my view, this is also true 
for European private law.   
The EU’s experimentation with the ‘public’ and ‘private law’ grammar 
options in the field of EU private law makes this area an interesting European 
laboratory. But in order to be able to experiment, one had better understand 
what one is actually experimenting with. Today Europe is facing 
unprecedented challenges which threaten its very existence and put under 
pressure the way of life that people like Martin are used to. Among them are 
climate change mitigation, a switch to a resource efficient circular economy, 
and the digitalisation of the marketplace and societies at large. EU Member 
States cannot cope with these challenges alone. Nor can the EU effectively 
address them without building a stronger connection with national legal 
systems. Beyond ideological battles, both public and private law concepts are 
hardly needed if we are to make any progress in addressing the grand 
challenges.    
The acknowledgement of the public/private distinction for descriptive 
and analytical purposes should lead to more evidence-based law-making at 
the EU level – the law-making that would allow the EU legislator to assess the 
relative merits of each model (or a combination of the two) more accurately, 
and to ultimately choose the one most suited to pursue a particular policy goal. 
The EU’s Better Regulation agenda21 provides an opportunity to improve 
private law making along these lines. In my understanding, better regulation in 
the field of private law does not mean ‘more Europe’ in the sense of more or 
full harmonization of private law, let alone the introduction of a European Civil 
Code. Rather, it implies the need to critically assess where we stand now in 
terms of the effectiveness of EU private law and the role of interpersonal justice 
therein, and what can be done better at the EU and national level.    
But policy-makers cannot do it alone. The legal framework for private law 
relationships in the areas harmonised by the EU increasingly looks like Cildo 
 
20 A. von Bogdandy, ‘The Idea of European Public Law Today’, in A. von Bogdandy, P.M. Huber & S. Cassese 
(eds), The Max Planck Handbooks in European Public Law. Vol. I: The Administrative State (Oxford University 
Press, 2017) 1, at 13. 
21 European Commission, Better Regulation Guidelines, SWD(2017) 350. 
 
 
Meirels’ sculpture ‘Babel 2001’ on display at London’s Tate Modern. Comprising 
hundreds of radios, each fine tuned to a different station, the sculpture relates 
to the biblical story of the Tower of Babel. It addresses the ideas of information 
overload and failed communication in modern times, and these are very true 
for EU private law. What is needed today is a common theoretical framework 
that would facilitate a meaningful dialogue between public and private 
lawyers involved in the making and implementation of EU private law. A 
dialogue that would lead to a better understanding of the role of private law 
in constituting and regulating markets in the public interest and the interplay 
between public and private law in this context. And it is here that the legal 
scholarship should take the lead. But to do so, we should dare to think out of 
the box and cross the disciplinary, departmental, and faculty boundaries, while 
at the same time acknowledging the specificities of public and private law, 
and the law and other disciplines. This is what I seek to promote through 
teaching and research as a Chair in European Private Law and Comparative 
Law within the research programmes ‘Public Interests and Private Relationships’ 
and ‘Public Trust and Public Law’, and within the Groningen Centre for 
European Financial Services Law. The ultimate goal is to bring us a bit closer to 
finding the right balance between public and private interests in our turbulent 
times, and this is what it is all about.   
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